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Aurora CORTI, L’Adversus Colotem di Plutarco. Storia di una polemica filo-
sofica, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2014, 325 p., ISBN 978-94-6270-009-3. 
Recent years have seen the publication of a number of significant studies of 
Plutarch’s Adversus Colotem.  The Adv. Col. has always been of interest, of course, 
as a source for Presocratic philosophers and also the philosophy of the Hellenistic 
Epicureans, Cyrenaics, and Academics.  But in these recent studies it has also been 
considered as a whole work in its own right, with critics and interpreters becoming 
increasingly interested not just in looking through Plutarch to access a Hellenistic 
or even earlier philosophical debate but in considering how and why Plutarch 
decided to respond to Colotes’ four-hundred year-old work On the fact that it is 
impossible even to live according the doctrines of the other philosophers. (See, for 
example, E. Kechagia’s substantial monograph Plutarch Against Colotes: A Lesson 
in History of Philosophy [Oxford, 2011] and the series of essays collected in the 
2013 volume of the online journal Aitia [http://aitia.revues.org/591].)   
Corti’s useful new work adds to this growing interest by offering a series of 
studies that deal with important aspects and themes of the work.  A first chapter 
looks carefully at the structure of Adv. Col. and asks what kind of work it is.  A 
second chapter then winds back the clock to give a detailed account of what we 
know of Colotes and his works, making excellent use of some difficult evidence to 
piece together as full a picture as is possible of the Epicurean’s general philo-
sophical background and œuvre. In these sections and throughout the book, Corti 
provides extremely full references to a wide range of secondary works and demons-
trates a sure-footed mastery of a wide range of scholarship. 
One question that immediately arises for anyone thinking about Adv. Col. is: 
What possible reason could Plutarch have for responding in such detail to this 
polemical tract by one of Epicurus’ long-dead attack-dogs?  Corti’s answer is that, 
by responding to Colotes’ super-apraxia argument, Plutarch can not only score 
some points against the same Epicureans he will take on in the companion work 
Non posse, but will also be able make a case for a certain view of the history of 
philosophy that emphasises an important continuity in the Academic tradition.  
And that is why Corti concentrates on the relationships between Colotes, Arce-
silaus, Plato and Plutarch and leaves aside for the most part the various skirmishes 
between Colotes and Plutarch over other philosophers (Democritus, Empedocles, 
Melissus et al.) that are also part of the overall landscape of the work. 
One of the more interesting themes of Corti’s account, therefore, and the 
theme that dominates chapter III (‘Plutarco di Cheronea: l’interpretazione uni-
taria dell’Accademia e la difesa del Platonismo’) is the stress placed on how Plu-
tarch and Colotes are in conflict over an entire philosophical tradition.  For Co-
lotes, only the Epicureans are free from the woeful misunderstandings that plague 
all the other philosophers he discusses and which render a life unliveable according 
to their respective theories. In particular, to his mind, a failure to recognise the 
truth of empiricism hampers any competing philosophical approach. For Plutarch, 
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on the other hand, there is an important truth recognised by all the various 
philosophers in Colotes’ sights that he takes to be one of the cornerstones of a con-
tinuous Academic tradition that embraces Plato and Arcesilaus and can trace its 
roots at least as far back as Parmenides: the sensible world does not present itself to 
us in a way that allows us to acquire stable knowledge. Only the intelligible world 
is sufficiently stable for that kind of cognition and so, in the face of what we 
perceive, the correct approach is to adopt a form of cognitive modesty that Arce-
silaus, for example, stressed in his notion of ‘suspending judgement’ (epoche) and 
which Plutarch himself endorses in his general attitude to our ability to acquire 
knowledge of, for example, the natural world.  In sum, what for Plutarch shows the 
grand and continuous tradition of companions in arms is precisely what for Co-
lotes shows that these non-Epicurean philosophers are all companions in guilt.  
The earlier Academy too, of course, had been in the business of constructing a 
positive philosophical lineage for its particular sceptical stance (see e.g. 1121F–
1122A), so there is a further and older layer to this interpretative debate.  Corti 
does well in picking through the complicated history of competing ancient philo-
sophical histories. 
The concentration on Arcseilaus as the central figure over whom Plutarch and 
Colotes are fighting also leads Corti to suggest that we should accept that there 
was a significant debate between the sceptical Academy and the early generations 
of the Epicurean school. Certainly, Colotes seems interested in putting Arcesilaus 
in his place, but Corti also wants to see a ‘polemica oscurata’ in the other direction 
(104–110).  For her, Arcesilaus is not merely involved in a dialectical exchange 
with the Stoics but also offers a theory of action in propria persona (the defence of 
this claim is the theme of her chapter IV) that also has an ethical import. This ethi-
cal import is in turn at least implicitly intended as a criticism of rival schools such 
as the Epicureans.  The evidence assembled here, however, and taken in particular 
from 1122D–1123E, seems to me to be inconclusive. Certainly, what we have in 
that passage is a response to the Epicurean criticisms from the perspective of the 
slandered Academy and that is clearly why, for example, there are references to the 
way in which the Epicureans themselves should recognise some kind of natural 
impulse towards whatever presents itself as good and pleasant without the need of 
any additional cognitive processing. But I see no reason to think that this is any-
thing other than Plutarch’s own construction offered in defence of Arcesilaus 
rather than evidence for some original Hellenistic Academic anti-Epicurean ar-
gument. That at least seems to be the general tactic adopted in the cases of the 
other philosophers that Colotes attacked: Plutarch sets out the criticisms, then 
points out that they are based on a misunderstanding of the original philosopher’s 
intention, and in fact it is the Epicureans who are subject to the problems that Co-
lotes detects in his rivals. Here too, Plutarch argues that Colotes cannot cope with 
the technical discussion of impression and assent and fails to comprehend Arce-
silaus’ position. Moreover, in fact it is the Epicureans who resolutely refused to be 
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moved by things that to everyone else are perfectly plain and evident, including the 
claim that sometimes the appearances we receive are not true. 
Elsewhere in the book, Corti offers some additional interesting pointers to-
wards the ascription to Arcesilaus of some kind of moral theory (see: 185–93 and 
266–7). The evidence here is again suggestive at best and I am less convinced that 
we can be confident that the connection between suspension of judgement and 
hesychia at 1124A (the attitude ‘of grown men’ as Plutarch puts it at 1124B) is 
something we can ascribe to Arcesilaus rather than an elaboration by Plutarch; it is 
an intriguing suggestion nevertheless and it is certainly possible that Plutarch took 
Arcesilaus’ overall message to be one of a kind of cognitive modesty in the face of 
the perceptible world that other more robustly empiricist schools fail to ap-
preciate. Although there are reasons to be cautious about the ascription of this 
ethical doctrine to Arcesilaus himself, therefore, it is certainly important to 
recognise that Plutarch sees that there is an ethical dimension to tackling these 
Epicurean criticisms. The closing sections of the work (from 1124D onwards) 
clearly show that Plutarch has strong reasons to think that Epicureanism is a mo-
rally dangerous movement and that standing up for the importance of piety and 
law is an important marker of grown-up philosophy. Even Democritus, Parme-
nides, Empedocles and Melissus were, in their different ways, men of law and ser-
vants of their respective cities (1126A–B). 
Another theme that Corti does not pursue but which nevertheless seems 
relevant to understanding Plutarch’s own presentation of how to do the history of 
philosophy properly is his regular gripe that Colotes, either wilfully or else due to 
sheer incompetence, is a terrible interpreter of philosophical texts.  At 1108D, for 
example, he complains that Colotes’ work hacks out chunks of his target texts and 
stitches them together like freaks displayed in the agora. Colotes, in other words, 
pays no attention to the proper charitable interpretation of the texts he reads and 
decontextualises parts of these works in order to serve a polemical purpose. (See 
also Kechagia, op. cit., 41–2.) Plutarch, we should therefore surmise, is a careful 
and sensitive reader of what these texts intend to say and is not limited by the 
simple literal understanding of what a particular author has written.  Similarly, at 
1114D (cited by Corti on p. 146–7), Plutarch puts the contrast between the inter-
pretative methodologies in the following terms: his opponent, Colotes, is wedded 
to the simple rhema while he is able to access and understand the pragma behind 
the particular vocabulary and expressions that these philosophers used. No doubt 
this contrast plays a role in the local disagreement between Plutarch and his chosen 
polemical opponent at this point in the text, but Plutarch is not merely scoring a 
point against his rival in term of scholarly rigour. The reading strategy that these 
comments promote also points towards Plutarch’s own understanding of the cor-
rect way to approach the history of philosophy and therefore the methods by 
which he feels himself able to present his preferred account of the history of his 
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own philosophical school. At 1114D, for example, it licenses Plutarch’s attempt to 
understand Parmenides as a sort of Platonist avant la lettre. 
I enjoyed Corti’s reading of Adv. Col. and, although I am perhaps less inclined 
than she is to read through the text to uncover earlier Hellenistic debates, the 
detailed account she provides of Colotes’ work and philosophical background and 
her presentation of Plutarch’s stance on the history of the Academy in response to 
Colotes’ attacks are important contributions to the growing recent literature 
devoted to this complicated and multi-layered work. 
James WARREN 
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge 
Maxime de TYR, Choix de conférences. Religion et philosophie, introduction, 
traduction et notes par Brigitte Pérez-Jean et Frédéric Fauquier, Paris, Les Belles 
Lettres, 2014 (La Roue à livres), 162 p. ISBN 978-2-251-33974-0 
La nécessité d’une traduction française nouvelle des écrits de Maxime de Tyr se 
faisait depuis longtemps ressentir. Plus de deux siècles se sont en effet écoulés de-
puis la traduction de Jean-Isaac Combes-Dounous (1758-1820) (2 tomes, Paris, 
1802), magistrat et helléniste qui avait publié aussi un Essai historique sur Platon, 
et coup d’œil rapide sur l’histoire du platonisme depuis Platon jusqu’à nous (2 tomes, 
Paris, 1809), ouvrage aujourd’hui oublié mais qui avait fait parler de lui en son 
temps. Cette traduction avait remplacé à son tour celle que le père Nicolas Guil-
lebert avait fait publier à Rouen en 1617. Depuis la traduction de Combes-Dou-
nous, l’intérêt en France pour l’œuvre de Maxime de Tyr, sans être considérable, ne 
fut pourtant pas inexistant. En témoignent le travail méritoire de Guy Soury 
(Études sur la philosophie religieuse de Maxime de Tyr, Paris, 1942) et la thèse iné-
dite de Jacques Puiggali (Études sur les Dialexeis de Maxime de Tyr, conférencier 
platonicien du IIe siècle, Lille, 1983). Cependant, une traduction nouvelle de son 
œuvre manquait et, en attendant que ce desideratum soit complètement comblé un 
jour, Brigitte Pérez-Jean, spécialiste du scepticisme antique, et son collaborateur 
Frédéric Fauquier ont assumé la tâche de traduire et d’annoter un choix repré-
sentatif des conférences de Maxime.  
La traduction est précédée par une introduction (p. 13-28) qui fait le point sur 
ce que l’on sait de la vie et de l’œuvre du philosophe de Tyr. Sa biographie est qua-
siment inconnue et des maigres informations qu’on en possède, on retient une 
seule date fiable, sa visite à Rome sous Commode entre mai 180 et décembre 192. 
Son identification avec Cassius Maximus auquel Artémidore de Daldis, auteur des 
Oneirocritica, dédie une partie de son ouvrage, est possible, voire probable, mais 
loin d’être certaine. L’œuvre de Maxime réunit quarante-et-une dialexeis ou confé-
rences transmises par une trentaine de manuscrits dont l’archétype est Parisin. gr. 
1962, copié à Constantinople à la fin du IXe siècle, manuscrit sur lequel se fondent 
les trois éditions modernes de l’œuvre de Maxime : H. Hobein (Leipzig, 1910), 
M. Trapp (Leipzig, 1994) et G. L. Koniaris (Berlin-New York, 1995). On trouve 
